Abstract-In the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. labor market experienced a remarkable polarization along with fast technological catch-up as Europe and Japan improved their global innovation performance. Is foreign technological convergence an important source of wage polarization? To answer this question, we build a multicountry Schumpeterian growth model with heterogeneous workers, endogenous skill formation, and occupational choice. We show that convergence produces polarization through business stealing and increasing competition in global innovation races. Quantitative analysis shows that these channels can be important sources of U.S. polarization. Moreover, the model delivers predictions on the U.S. wealth-income ratio consistent with empirical evidence.
innovation activity, although some European countries, such as Germany and France, played a major role in some sectors (Impullitti, 2010; Akcigit, Ates, & Impullitti, 2014) .
Did the acceleration of foreign technological competition in the 1980s contribute to the polarization of the U.S. labor market? To answer this question, we construct a quality ladder growth model (Aghion & Howitt, 1992; Grossman & Helpman, 1991) with two asymmetric countries and heterogeneous workers. Firms compete for global market leadership investing in quality-improving innovation. Schumpeterian competition for innovation allows successful innovators to replace incumbents. The asymmetry between countries is represented by a technology gap in innovation: firms in the leading country have a better innovation technology in all sectors of the economy. There are three occupations. Innovation, production, and services: Innovation workers are employed in the production of new ideas to improve the quality of the goods. Blue-collar production workers are employed in the manufacture of goods. Service sector workers provide personal services that allow their employer to save work time. Workers have heterogeneous ability and can acquire working skills through education. Educational attainment allows workers to become skilled and work in innovation activities. Workers who do not acquire education can work as production workers or in service occupations.
In equilibrium, the following allocation of abilities to occupations is obtained: workers with high innate ability become skilled and hire service sector workers, those with intermediate ability work in production occupations, and, those at the bottom of the ability distribution work in personal service occupations. Reductions in the technology gap have the following effects on the leading economy. First, as foreign firms start innovating more efficiently, they obtain quality leadership in more sectors, thereby stealing market shares from firms in the leading country and reducing the demand of production workers. This business-stealing effect reduces wages of production workers in the leading economy. Second, the reduction in the technology gap makes it harder for domestic firms to innovate in the global economy, thus pushing them to devote more labor resources to innovation. This global competition effect triggers an increase in the demand for skilled workers. Through these two channels, increasing foreign competition generates more polarization in the leading economy's labor market: the wage of skilled workers relative to that of production workers increases, thereby raising inequality at the top of the skill distribution. The wages of service sector workers relative to those of production workers increase, thus reducing inequality at the bottom of the distribution. The increase in the demand and wages of service sector workers is a by-product of rising inequality at the top of the distribution. As skilled labor time becomes more valuable, skilled workers demand more personal services in order to free time to devote to their highly remunerative job.
Another key prediction of our model is the positive link between foreign technological competition, innovation, and the wealth-income ratio. The business stealing and the global competition effect of foreign technological catching up increase the value of innovation in the global economy. In our Schumpeterian economy, the value of innovation is determined by the value of the leading firm in each product line, and aggregate wealth is the sum of the market values of all leading firms. Hence, our model establishes a natural connection between international competition, innovation, and the dynamics of the wealth-income ratio.
In an extended version of the model, we allow for a more general technology where skilled and unskilled workers are employed in production and innovation with different factor intensities, we introduce iceberg trade costs, and we specify the workers' ability distribution. We then calibrate this generalized model and use it to explore the link between the technology gap, labor market polarization, and the wealthincome ratio quantitatively. In our two-country world, the United States is the leading economy, and the rest of the world represents the foreign country. The technology gap between countries is calibrated to reproduce the distribution of patents in the U.S. Patent Office. A closure of the innovation technology gap reproduces a sizable part of the convergence in U.S. and foreign patent shares shown in the data between 1980 and 2000, along with a nonnegligible share of wage and jobs polarization. Our model can replicate about 10% of the increase in inequality at the top of the distribution, 16% of the increase in the skill premium, and about 18% of the decrease in inequality at the bottom observed between 1980 and 2000. Finally, the decline in the technology gap generates a striking increase in the U.S. wealth-income ratio, reproducing about two-thirds of the change documented by Piketty and Zucman (2014) .
The recent empirical evidence on labor market polarization in the United States has triggered a new line of research aimed at understanding those facts. Autor and Dorn (2013) present a simple task-based model with capital skill complementarity formalizing the so-called routinization hypothesis. This hypothesis posits that technological change complements skilled tasks, replaces routine tasks, and is neutral to service occupations. Hence technology affects the wage structure through a postulated factor bias. We propose a complementary approach according to which polarization is driven by the factor intensity of innovation rather than the factor bias of technological progress. Moreover, Autor and Dorn treat technological progress and the supply of skills as exogenous. 1 We complement their analysis by endogenizing 1 Hemous and Olsen (2014) embed the routinization hypothesis into a fully fledged dynamic model of directed technical change and show that technological progress can generate phases of polarization and phases where inequality increases uniformly. both technological change and skill formation, as well as by exploring the key role of globalization.
In our economy, the increase in the demand and wages of service sector workers relative to other unskilled tasks comes from a general equilibrium market mechanism: foreign competition raises inequality at the top of the distribution, thereby inducing skilled workers to demand more personal services and devote more time to their highly paid jobs. This mechanism finds direct empirical support in Mazzolari and Ragusa (2013) who, using U.S. city-level data, show that the increase in the top wages bill can explain about onethird of the growth of employment of noncollege workers in low-skill personal services in the 1990s.
Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on globalization and wage inequality. A large body of work has studied the effects of trade liberalization on wage inequality across workers with different skills when technology is constant (e.g., Epifani & Gancia, 2008; Burstein & Vogel, 2012) or when technology is endogenous and interacts with trade in shaping the wage structure (e.g., Dinopoulos & Segerstrom, 1999; Acemoglu, 2003) . We depart from this literature along two main lines: first, while existing papers focus on economies with two skills and explain the evolution of the skilled-unskilled wage gap, the skill premium, we work in environments with a continuum of skills allocated to different occupations, which allows us to study inequality in several parts of the wage distribution. Second, we move from a widely studied dimension of globalization, trade liberalization, to the less explored channel of crosscountry technological catch-up. A small emerging literature has started to analyze the effects of foreign technological catching up on growth and welfare (e.g., Eaton & Kortum, 2007; Hsieh & Ossa, 2011; Impullitti, 2010; Akcigit et al., 2014) . Our paper contributes to this line of research studying the effects of foreign catching up on the structure of wages, employment, and the evolution of the wealth-to-income ratio. 2
II. Stylized Facts
In this section, we discuss some key facts providing the motivation for the paper, as well as empirical support for the quantitative analysis.
A. Wage Polarization
Since the early 1980s, the United States has shown a remarkable increase in labor market polarization. Autor and Dorn (2013) document a nonmonotonic change in employment and wages along the skill distribution. Working with Census IPUMS and American Community Survey data, they rank 318 occupations in all U.S. nonfarm employment by skill level using the average wages of workers in each occupation. Their results show that employment changes in Autor and Dorn (2013) .
the period 1980 to 2005 have an inverted U-shaped pattern. Employment in the middle of the skill distribution declines substantially, while the tails show a steady and somewhat puzzling increase. Digging deeper into the occupational structure of these changes, they document that most of the increase in employment and wages in the lower tail can be attributed to one group of occupations that they name service occupations: low-education occupations involving caring, assisting, and entertaining other people, such as cleaners, janitors, security guards, food service workers, gardeners, home health aides, hairdressers, beauticians, and recreation occupations. Table 1 shows the employment dynamics for three groups of occupations. Skilled workers include the occupations at the top of the skill distribution. Unskilled workers outside service occupations comprise a low-educated occupational group including production and crafts jobs, operative and assembly occupations, transportation, construction, mechanical, mining, clerical and retail sales jobs. The third group includes the service occupations already described. The data show a strong increase in the employment share of skilled workers, which grew by 25% between 1980 and 2000. Similarly, the employment share of service occupations increased by about 17% in the 1980-2000 period. The employment share of unskilled nonservice occupations, however, declined by about 16%. Table 2 shows the levels and changes in wages for the three groups of occupations in the same period. We can see a substantial increase in the wages of skilled workers and a smaller but nonnegligible increase in service occupations' wages. The wages of unskilled workers in nonservice occupations instead exhibit virtually no change. Focusing on the relative changes across these groups, we can look at the dynamics of the gap between the top and the middle of the distribution and that between the middle and the bottom. The first gap is represented by the ratio of skilled over unskilled (nonservice) wages, which shows a 21% increase up to 2000. The second gap is the ratio between the wages of unskilled workers outside of personal service occupations and those of service workers. This ratio declines by 16 percentage points up to 2000. We also compute a more standard measure of inequality, the skill premium, defined as the average wage of skilled workers over the average wage of all unskilled workers, including service sector workers. 3 In line with inequality at the top of the distribution, the skill premium shows a remarkable increase after 1980. Piketty and Zucman (2014) report that the wealth-toincome ratio in the United States rose from slightly above 350% in 1980 to 450% in 2000. The wealth of a nation is defined as the sum of domestic capital and net foreign assets. In the United States, the foreign asset position in those years is negligible; hence, the wealth-to-income ratio and domestic capital-to-income ratio coincide. For this reason, they use the terms wealth-income and capital-income ratio interchangeably. Capital in the data is the sum of agricultural land, housing, the value of financial assets net of liabilities, and the value of net nonfinancial assets. Figure 1 shows the evolution of private wealth and its components in the period we are analyzing. As we can see, financial wealth is the driving force of the increasing wealth-to-income ratio, while housing wealth (net of mortgages) and nonfinancial assets, which include tangible capital, are fairly constant. 4 About two-thirds of financial assets are accounted for by corporate wealth. In figure 2 , we report the two measures of corporate wealth that Piketty and Zucman (2014) constructed. The first measure is the equity value, which is the market value of the firm, and the second is the net worth, 3 The average unskilled wage is obtained using the employment shares of the unskilled (no service) and service occupation workers as weights. 4 Nonfinancial assets include produced tangible capital and nonproduced tangible capital. Tangible assets is the typical economic measure of physical capital, which includes all tangible fixed assets-for example, buildings and structures, machinery and equipment, cultivated biological resources, and weapon systems. Nonproduced tangibles include natural resources such as land, oil, and gas. 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Total Private Wealth Housing (net value) Non-housing non-financial assets Net financial assets Piketty and Zucman (2014) . 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Net worth Equity Value Equity/Net Worth (Tobin Q) Piketty and Zucman (2014) .
B. The Wealth-to-Income Ratio
which is the book value of the firm, which comes from a perpetual inventory method-based estimates of tangible assets. The difference between the two measures is the residual corporate wealth, and their ratio is the well-known Tobin's Q. Both measures of corporate wealth exhibit a striking increase in the period of interest. The book value rises from 150% of income in 1980 to 220% in 2000, while the equity value from 67% in 1980 skyrockets to 280% in 2000.
C. International Technological Competition
During this period of increasing wage polarization and a fast-growing wealth-to-income ratio, the United States experienced increasing foreign technological competition. The data show a global convergence pattern in several measures of innovation performance. The United States, the undisputed technological leader in the post-World War II period, was progressively challenged by Japan and European countries in the late 1970s and 1980s. Figure 3 shows the stark convergence in patent shares in the U.S. Patent office; in 1977, about two-thirds of patents came from American firms; ten years later, only one-half of patents had U.S. origins. Most of the convergence took place in the 1970s and 1980s, while the following years showed no major changes. This convergence in patenting activity did not happen because of a slowdown in U.S. patenting but to a stark acceleration in foreign patents. The number of foreign patents grew by about 60% between 1977 and 1988, while U.S. patents did not show any change in those years. This increase is mainly driven by Japan, whose share rose from 9% in 1977 to about 20% in 1988. Along these lines, Akcigit et al. (2014) show that a similar trend can be seen in patent citations. Disaggregating at the level of technology classes, they document a convergence trend in global patenting also at the micro/sectorial level. Together with convergence in innovation output (patents), recent research has also highlighted similar patterns for global innovation inputs. Impullitti (2010) documents a strong convergence in private R&D spending between the United States and a group of fast-growing advanced economies in the 1970s and 1980s.
III. The Model
In this section, we present the baseline model and use it to analyze the interaction among globalization, innovation, and the occupation and wage structure.
A. Households
Consumption. The economy is populated by two regions with the same population and preferences. In both regions, households are heterogeneous in their abilities to acquire skills. At birth, members draw their ability θ ∈ [0, 1] from a distribution Γ(θ). Households have identical preferences for a continuum of consumption goods ω ∈ [0, 1], and each is endowed with a unit of labor or study time whose supply generates no disutility. A household of type θ is modeled as a dynastic family that maximizes intertemporal utility,
where population is specified according to N(t) = N(0)e nt , with initial population N(0) normalized to 1 and a constant population growth rate n. The rate of time preference is ρ, with ρ > n. The utility per person is given by
where d θ ( j, ω, t) is the per member quantity of good ω ∈ [0, 1] of quality j ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...} purchased by a household of ability θ at time t ≥ 0. A new vintage of good ω yields a quality λ times that of the previous vintage, with λ > 1. Different versions of the same good ω are regarded by consumers as perfect substitutes after adjusting for their quality ratios, and j max (ω, t) denotes the maximum quality in which the good ω is available at time t. Parameter η ∈ [1, ∞) is the elasticity of substitution across varieties, which allows for gross substitutability across varieties.
At each point in time, households choose the quantity purchased of each good d θ (j, ω, t) in order to maximize equation (2) subject to the per period expenditure constraint
, where c θ (t) is planned time t consumption expenditure. Notice that the household will be purchasing in each line only the product with the lowest price per unit of quality. Hence, a household's demand for each product is
where q (ω, t) = λ (η−1)j max (ω,t) represents the quality of good ω and P(t) is a general price index, defined as
Notice that the quality of the demanded version of a variety, q (ω, t), positively affects its quantity while negatively affecting the overall price index. Given the optimal allocation of expenditures across different product lines at a given moment t in equation (3), households choose the intertemporal allocation of consumption maximizing equation (1) with respect to the intertemporal budget constraint
, where asset market clearing implies that per capita assets are equal to the sum of firm values a(t)
the standard Euler equation for consumption.
Supply of skills and personal services. Individuals are finitely lived members of infinitely lived households, being continuously born at rate β n and dying at rate δ, with β n − δ = n > 0; V > 0 denotes the exogenous duration of their life. 5 They choose to acquire education and become skilled, if at all, at the beginning of their lives; for the duration of their schooling period, denoted T H < V , the individual cannot work. We assume agents have heterogeneous innate abilities drawn from a cumulative distribution function Γ(θ).
In country K = D (domestic), F (foreign) an individual with ability θ decides to acquire education if the expected wage income is larger than that of working as unskilled, that is,
where w K L and w k H are the wage per unit of abilities of the unskilled and skilled workers, respectively. Parameter 0 < γ H < 1 establishes a threshold ability requirement so that an agent with ability θ > γ H is able to accumulate θ − γ H units of skills after schooling, while a person with ability below γ H gains no skills from education. Parameter γ H can be interpreted as a fixed cost of education in terms of the skilled wage. We focus here on steady-state analysis, in which all variables grow at a constant rate and w L , w H , and c θ are all constant. From the Euler equation, (4), we obtain r(t) = ρ at all dates. Equation (5) yields the cutoff ability level θ K 0 above which agents acquire education: Each unskilled individual can work either in production occupations or as a personal service worker. Personal services allow people to spend less time on house chores, babysitting, transportation, and other activities that would otherwise detract time from other kinds of activities, such as production and innovation occupations. Since in this model individuals do not have a desire for leisure, we can assume that each hour saved thanks to service workers will be used to work more. We will also posit that there is an upper bound, normalized to 1, of the extra work made possible by personal services. 6 Moreover, each unit time of personal service provides its employer, who must be a different person, 1 − extra time for work, with 0 < < 1. This implies that in equilibrium, unskilled workers of the same or lower ability levels will not demand services, because it would cost w K L to obtain extra labor time, which pays w
A high-skilled worker of generic ability θ finds it profitable to buy personal services from an unskilled worker of ability θ if, at the cost of θ w K L , he or she can obtain an additional wage income w
The lowest possible θ at which hiring a personal service is worthwhile in country K, denoted θ K HS , and the higher possible θ supplied by the unskilled, denoted θ K LS , must equalize the service cost and employer's economic benefit, that is,
The mass of service workers must be equal to the mass of skilled workers employing them,
Plugging equation (8) into equation (7) and solving for θ
which, since Γ −1 (.) is monotonically increasing, gives θ
K HS
as a decreasing function of the relative skilled wage and therefore θ K LS as an increasing function of the relative skilled wage. Intuitively, a higher relative remuneration of skilled occupations increases the demand for service occupations. Hence, invoking equation (6), we can write dθ
The fraction of the population opting out of education determines the per capita supply of unskilled labor
Intuitively, a higher relative skilled wage reduces the cutoff ability to acquire education θ K 0 , thereby reducing the share of unskilled workers. A fraction 1 − Γ(θ K 0 ) of the population decides to attain education, and the skilled workforce is represented by the subset of these agents that as of date t have completed their schooling period, that is, individuals born between t − V and t − T r . The per capita supply of skilled labor in efficiency units at time t is then
with 0 < φ ≡ e n(V −T r ) − 1 / e nV − 1 < 1 and
is the average ability of educated workers, which takes into account that above the cutoff θ K HS workers get and extra 1 − working time from hiring service workers. Using equation (11), we derive
hence the supply of skills is decreasing in θ K 0 .
B. Production
In each country, firms can hire unskilled workers to produce consumption good, ω ∈ [0, 1], under a constant returns to scale technology with one worker producing one unit of product. The unskilled wage rate is w K L , and we set w F L = 1, so that the unskilled foreign wage is the numeraire of this economy. Assuming instantaneous price competition, Bertrand equilibrium implies that in each industry, only the product with the highest quality is produced. Quality leaders in each sector are challenged by followers that employ skilled workers to discover the next top-quality product. In this model, as typical of quality ladder frameworks, a patent expires as soon as the next top-quality product is invented. Successful innovation yields global market leadership, which is protected by a perfectly enforceable patent law.
We assume that the technologies to produce goods one quality ladder below the top are obsolete and diffuse freely. This assumption allows foreign successful innovators to become global market leaders. 7 We allow for international trade in goods, but we do not consider multinational companies in this model. In addition, while allowing for perfect patent protection, we rule out an international market for patent royalties. Therefore, in our model, only domestic firms can produce and export the goods patented in the country. Finally, we do not consider international trade in assets.
As will become clearer in the next sections, as a consequence of the technology gap between the two countries, country D has global market leadership in a wider range of sectors, which drives up the demand for its manufacturing labor. For this reason, in all our equilibria, the unskilled wage in country D will be higher than that of country
Since both domestic and foreign followers operate with the same technology and foreign unskilled labor is cheaper, domestic followers are not an effective competitive threat. Moreover, we assume that the quality jump λ is not high enough that each top-quality producer firm can maximize profits unconstrained in both markets. 8 Thus the price of a top-quality good in a sector ω is
Notice that this implies that w D L ≤ λw F L , because otherwise country D firms would lose all markets and unskilled jobs. 9 This "narrow gap" case (Grossman & Helpman, 1991) allows for equilibrium product-cycle trade (Vernon, 1966) , with global market leadership shifting from domestic to foreign firms as the latter innovate and vice versa. Although the foreign region has a cost advantage in production, equilibrium guarantees that the wage gap is not so large that a foreign follower can price a domestic leader out of the market without innovating.
From demand (3), we conclude that the demand for each product ω is
where c
dθ is average per capita expenditure. Notice that under the pricing condition, equation (12), the price index becomes P(t)
is the average quality in the economy. Therefore, using equation (13) and dropping time indexes for notational simplicity, we can write
Since supply and demand of goods are equal in equilibrium, the stream of monopoly profits accruing to domestic quality leaders is π
, and the profit of the foreign leader is π
C. Global Innovation Races and the Value of a Firm
In each industry, firms employ skilled workers to discover the next top-quality version of their products. The arrival rate of innovation in industry ω at time t is I(ω, t), which is the sum of the Poisson arrival rate of innovation produced by all firms targeting product ω. The innovation technology available to a firm i in region K for innovation in sector ω is
where h K i (ω, t) is labor input in innovation by firm i, in industry ω, and X(ω, t) > 0 measures the degree of complexity of innovation, α is a positive congestion parameter, and
are the total skilled labor and the total innovation rates in sector ω, respectively. This technology implies that each firm's instantaneous probability of success is a decreasing function of the total domestic labor resources devoted to innovation in an industry. A possible interpretation of this property is that when firms increase innovation inputs in a sector, the probability of duplicative innovation effort also increases, thereby reducing the probability that any single firm discovers the next vintage of goods. Therefore, the sector-specific negative externality in innovation technology produces decreasing returns to innovation at the industry level. Moreover, equation (15) implies that this negative externality is also region specific. 10 Notice that equation (15) 
The complexity index X(ω, t) is introduced to avoid the counterfactual prediction of the first-generation innovation-driven growth models that the size of a region affects its steady-state growth (Jones, 1995) . We eliminate the strong scale effect by assuming
with 0 < φ 1 < 1. Therefore, the more advanced the good relative to the average quality, the more difficult a further innovation. Moreover, even for an average-quality good (i.e., if there exists an ω such that q (ω, t) = Q(t)), the higher the average quality itself, the more difficult innovationin this case, X(ω, t) = Q 1−φ 1 t -which incorporates Jones's (1995) increasing complexity argument to rule out the strong scale effect. Equation (16) implies that, log-differentiating the difficulty index between quality jumps in the sector, its evolution obeysẊ(ω, t)/X(ω, t) = −φ 1Q (t)/Q(t).
Each innovating firm chooses the labor resources devoted to innovation h K i in order to maximize its expected discounted profits. Free entry into innovation races drives profits to 0, yielding
where v K (ω, t) is the value of a firm in sector ω and country K. This condition states that the cost of one unit of skilled labor employed in innovation w K H must be equal to its benefits, represented by the marginal product of labor in innovation
Notice that despite the leaders and followers having the same production and innovation technology, the free entry condition implies that we 10 There is strong empirical evidence on the nonlinearity of the relationship between innovative activity of a country (measured using patent data) and its R&D investment. Working with a large sample of U.S. firm-level data, Hall, Griliches, and Hausman (1986) find an elasticity of patents to R&D of 0.5. The evidence surveyed in Kortum (1993) suggests point estimates for the patent/R&D elasticity in the range 0.1 to 0.6. More recently, Blundell, Griffeth, and Windmeijer (2002) find a long-run elasticity of 0.5. can compute the equilibrium focusing only on the followers' innovation. 11 Efficient financial markets channel savings into innovative firms that issue a security paying the new monopoly stock market value if they win the race and 0 otherwise. Since there is a continuum of industries, and simultaneous and independent innovation races, consumers can perfectly diversify away risk: the expected rate of return of a stock issued by a firm is equal to the riskless rate of return r(t). It is easy to show that this leads to the following stock market value of a firm,
where I(ω, t) denotes the worldwide Poisson arrival rate of an innovation that will destroy the monopolist's profits in industry ω. This is the Schumpeterian rate of creative destruction, which implies that the expected value of a patent is decreasing in the total innovation of the industry. Substituting for the value of the firm from equation (18) into (17) and using equation (15) to express the number of skilled workers in terms of the innovation rate, we obtain the following conditions:
These conditions, together with the Euler equation, summarize the utility-maximizing household choice of consumption, savings, and education and the profit-maximizing choice of production and innovation. Innovation arrival rates determine the evolution of the average quality of goods in the economy Q t . Finally, in all industries, firms from both regions compete in innovation. Hence global innovation in each sector is
, where I D (ω, t) and I F (ω, t) are domestic and foreign innovation.
Assumption 1 (Technology Gap).
We introduce a gap between the two countries in terms of innovation technology parameter A. Since goods ω ∈ [0, 1] are symmetric (same preferences and same technologies for production and innovation), the only source of structural asymmetry between the two countries is the difference between their innovation productivity. Since there is no sectoral heterogeneity in this economy, we can write I D (ω, t) = I D (t) and I F (ω, t) = I F (t) for all ω. In a steady state, the per industry probabilities of innovation per unit of time will be constant over time, which allows us to drop time indexes and write I D and I F . Differentiating Q with respect to time, it is straightforward to prove that
The growth rate of aggregate quality is proportional to the global arrival rate of innovation.
D. Labor Markets
The production technology specified above implies that the demand for unskilled workers is equal to the total production of goods in each national economy plus the total demand for personal services. The unskilled labor market-clearing condition is
where
is the average ability of unskilled workers employed in production. The left-hand side is the supply of unskilled workers in manufacturing in efficiency units. The right-hand side is the demand for unskilled workers. We define q K = Q K /Q, as the share of sectors with country K s leadership, where
is the average quality of the sectors in which country K has global leadership (B K is the measure of these sectors), and q D + q F = 1 by construction. 12 The market-clearing condition for skilled workers is
where we define x = Q 1−φ /N = 1 0 X(ω)dω/N, which is the aggregate difficulty index of innovation normalized by population. The left-hand side is the domestic supply of skilled labor (per capita) from equation (10), and the right-hand side is the domestic demand for skilled workers obtained after integrating equations (15) and (16).
Wage inequality. Since our main aim is to analyze the link between the technology gap and wage inequality, we need to specify the measures of inequality we want to focus on. The education choice and demand for service sector workers partition the worker/ability space as follows. Skilled workers are those whose abilities lie in θ 
respectively. We will mainly focus on two wage gaps: the skilled/unskilled (production) workers gap and the unskilled (production)/service workers gap,
, both depending on the relative wage and on the relative average ability of workers. 
IV. Steady-State Equilibrium
Equation (24) dictates a long-term restriction on innovation rates based on the relative quality index and the sector sizes, thereby generalizing the "semiendogenous growth" restrictions highlighted by Jones (1995) . Quite interestingly, equation (24) shows that our version of increasing complexity allows some degree of endogeneity in the composition of innovation rates across sectors and countries. Per capita expenditure is constant in steady state; thus, the Euler equation (4) yields r = ρ. In steady state, the free entry conditions in innovation (19) take the following general form:
where we have the expressions for profits specified above. Moreover, the share of industries with country K leadership is
To close the model, we need to specify the national budget constraints. Consumption expenditure plus savings in each country equates national income, which is the value of the labor income (wages of unskilled and skilled workers) plus firm profits:
where, since saving is equal to innovation spending, it appears as both an expenditure and income (of the skilled workers). Moreover, to avoid double counting, we net out the wage of personal service workers because they are paid by their employers (the skilled workers) in order to earn additional skilled wages. 
Moreover, equations (28) and (29) are not independent, and they lead to
The steady-state equilibrium system is characterized by thir-
, and thirteen equations (6), (9), (21), (22), (24), (25), (26), (27), and (32). In the next section, we analyze its key properties.
V. Analytical Results
The goal of this section is to characterize some key equilibrium properties of the model. All proofs of propositions can be found in the online appendix. 13 The effect of foreign technological competition on the skill and wage structure of the domestic country works through two channels: the international business-stealing channel and the global competition channel. In providing the key economic intuitions, we focus on the link between changes in the technology gap and changes in the relative wage of skilled workers. As shown in section IIIA, the rel-
is the key variable that determines the whole wage and skill structure.
A. International Business Stealing
A reduction in the technology gap increases the relative innovation intensity I F /I D , thereby reducing the share of sectors with domestic leadership q D . This is the businessstealing effect, typical of Schumpeterian models, in an open economy environment with two innovating asymmetric countries. As foreign innovation technology improves, foreign firms obtain global leadership in more sectors; as a D L leads directly to a higher relative skilled wage. Moreover, a reduction of unskilled wages increases domestic firm profits, thereby triggering an increase in the incentive to innovate and in the demand for skilled workers, which further increases the relative skilled wage. 14 
B. Global Competition Effect
Better foreign innovation technology generates an increase in the demand for skilled workers in the domestic country through its effect on the difficulty of innovation. As foreign innovation becomes relatively more productive, the relative innovation intensity I F /I D increases. Due to the technology gap, country D innovates more than F, and since innovation technology, equation (15), has decreasing returns at the country level, an increase in I F /I D raises global innovation efficiency, leading to higher innovation and growth. In our semiendogenous Schumpeterian growth model, steadystate quality growth is pinned down by population growth: combining equation (24) and (20), we obtain the steady-state growth rate:
The growth-enhancing effect of a lower international technology gap can then only be temporary and fades away in the long run due to the increase in the innovation difficulty index. Equilibrium condition (24) implies that in steady state, domestic innovation I D decreases to exactly offset the increase in foreign innovation. 15 The skilled labor market clearing condition, equation (22), tells us that due to the increase in innovation difficulty, the domestic country is forced to devote more labor resources to innovation, and this triggers an increase in skilled wages. 16 We name this the global competition effect: stronger foreign competition for innovation makes it harder for domestic firms to innovate in the global economy, thus forcing them to devote more (skilled) labor to innovation. 15 Recall that our numeraire is the foreign unskilled wage; hence, a reduction in I D must be interpreted as a decline in the domestic innovation rate measured in terms of foreign unskilled wages. 16 The skilled labor market clearing condition, equation (22) lower) and more unskilled workers choose to be employed in service occupations (θ D LS is higher), the share of unskilled workers in production shrinks.
As shown in the appendix, the equilibrium ability cutoff to acquire education for country F can be obtained in closed form as a function of parameters, θ . Since θ F 0 is the key variable to determine the wage structure, if changes in the relative innovation efficiency do not affect this cutoff, labor market polarization remains unchanged. To interpret this result, recall that in this economy, the competitive fringe pinning down the equilibrium pricing of firms is represented by the foreign country unit cost of production, the unskilled wage w F L , which is our numeraire. As discussed above, a reduction in the technology gap A D /A F reduces the unskilled wage in country D and increases the profits of its firms, boosting innovation and the demand for skilled labor. In country F, this mechanism does not operate: since the competitive fringe is a foreign unit cost, the markup of foreign firms is (λ − 1) /λ, which implies that their profits are not affected by the reduction in the technology gap. As a consequence, the business-stealing effect does not lead to any change in the demand for skills, leaving the wage structure unaltered. In the extended model that we use for quantitative analysis, we show that in the presence of trade costs, there exists a parameterization allowing the unit cost of both countries to potentially represent the competitive fringe. Under this parameterization, the neutrality result discussed here breaks down, and changes in the technology gap affect polarization in both countries. Finally, notice that the global competition effect on the wage structure is not operative either: the increase in the difficulty index, which could potentially increase the demand for skills, is offset by the increase in the innovation efficiency A F . In order to keep the analysis tractable and derive the final set of properties of our model, we now assume that abilities are distributed uniformly. This assumption allows us to move from predicting the effects of changes in the technology gap on the relative wages per units of skills, to predicting the effects on average wages at the top, the middle, and the bottom of the skill distribution. As shown in proposition 2, a reduction in the innovation technology gap increases the relative wage of skilled workers , but has an ambiguous effect on the average quality of production workers, as we saw above. With uniform ability distribution, the overall effect of the lower technology gap on the relative service sector wage is positive. Hence, we can conclude that fiercer foreign technological competition brought about by a reduction in the innovation technology gap increases wage polarization, benefiting skilled workers and damaging workers in the middle of the skill distribution more than those at the bottom.
Proposition 3. Under a uniform distribution of abilities, Γ(θ
K 0 ) = θ K 0 , a
VI. Globalization and the Wealth-to-Income Ratio:
A Schumpeterian View
Besides the predictions on the evolution of personal wage inequality, which tracks wage difference across individuals, our theory has implications for a different dimension of inequality: the wealth-to-income ratio. The data reported in figure 1 show that the increase in the wealth-to-income ratio in the last decades is essentially due to the rise of financial assets, with housing and nonfinancial assets being substantially constant. More than two-thirds of financial assets are represented by equities, the market value of corporations. Since the stock market value of firms is the core engine of growth in the Schumpeterian framework, our model is a good candidate to interpret the observed changes in the wealth-to-income ratio by linking them to the dynamics of international technological competition.
In our model, country D's aggregate wealth, denoted W D , coincides with the stock market value of all the profitgenerating firms in the economy, W D =ṽ D q D , whereṽ D is the market value of a generic monopolistic firm. 17 As in the classical Schumpeterian theory (Aghion & Howitt, 1992) , 17 The value of a generic monopolistic quality leader is
the innovation free-entry condition, equation (19), equates the expected value of a new patent to the unit cost of innovation, here represented by the wage of a skilled labor unit. If we multiply both sides by the share of skilled workers in the economy H D and use equation (22), the left-hand side becomes the aggregate value of the flow of new patents and the right side the flow of savings in the economy, as shown in equation (30) 
whereλ = λ η−1 − 1 −1 and g given by equation (33) 
This allows us to obtain the following result:
Proposition 4. A reduction in the innovation technology gap A D /A F raises country D's wealth to national income ratioβ D .
The economic intuition is the following. Since in our semiendogenous growth model, the long-run growth rate is constant, the wealth-to-income ratio increases only if saving increases. As aggregate saving equals total investment in innovation and the incentive to innovate is dictated by the market value of firms, the corporate wealth-to-income ratio is strictly increasing in innovation. Faster innovation in our economy has only transitional effects on growth, which lead to persistently higher levels of saving and the wealth-to-income ratio. Since in our model, a reduction in the technology gap increases the demand for skilled workers and innovation spending in the leading country, it also boosts the wealth-to-income ratio along with wage polarization.
We can conclude that our model captures the salient stylized facts of the U.S. labor market reported in tables 1 and 2 and figure 2, together with the evolution of the distribution of global patents shown in figure 3.
VII. Quantitative Analysis
In order to take the model to the data, we generalize it along two dimensions. First, we remove the assumption that skilled workers are used only in innovation and unskilled only in production. Second, we assume away free trade introducing trade barriers in the form of iceberg costs. We then calibrate the parameters of the model to match some key statistics of the data discussed in section II, compute the numerical solution using the calibrated parameters, and explore the effects of our dimension of globalization on wage polarization and the wealth-income ratio.
A. Generalizations
We generalize the technology of our economy, allowing skilled and unskilled workers to be employed in both production and innovation. The production technology is defined by the unit cost function:
We assume that the unit production cost in country F is the numeraire, that is,
The innovation technology is described by the unit cost function,
where the difficulty index, X(ω) = q(ω)/Q φ , is the same as in the benchmark model. As in the previous sections, the technology gap is captured assuming A D > A F . The countryspecific production technology parameter, z K , is introduced for generality and will not play any particular role besides that of contributing to the numerical fit of the model in the calibration.
Assumption 2 (Factor Intensity
innovation is the skill-intensive activity. With the CobbDouglas technologies above, the factor bias of innovation is pinned down by assuming β > ϕ. 18 This assumption implies less extreme factor intensity compared to the baseline model. As we will show, qualitatively it does not change the basic mechanisms: an increase in the incentive to innovate will still increase the relative demand for skilled workers, and a reduction in a country's share of leadership will still reduce the relative demand for unskilled workers. Quantitatively, factor intensity parameters β and ϕ will be important to determine the size of these changes.
We also introduce trade barriers in the form of iceberg costs. Firms need to ship τ > 1 units of goods in order to sell one unit abroad. In the presence of trade costs, the "narrow gap" assumption becomes τZ
As in the basic model, this allows quality leaders in country D to overcome a higher production cost by supplying a higher-quality good. Trade costs complicate the optimal pricing of firms compared to the basic model. The optimal price choice of country F firms selling their product domestically (i.e., in country F market), 18 This assumption guarantees a strictly concave transformation curve between the production of goods and innovation probabilities. Any parameter configuration wih β = ϕ would avoid a linear transformation curve. The upside is that we no longer need the congestion externality parameter α, which can be set equal to 0 at no loss. 
In fact, in both cases, the limit price is anchored to the quality jump, λ, times the unit cost of the world competitive fringe, which is country F s production cost Z F = 1. Slightly more complex is the optimal strategy of firms selling in country 
H ) < τ, the relevant competitive fringe in country D market would be country D firms able to enter with the previous version of the good. Consequently, the optimal price choice of country D firms selling their product domestically and of country F exporting firms leads to the same limit pricing: To stay close to the baseline model, in which only country F firms effectively limit-price country D firms, we add the assumption that firms in country D have to pay a small fixed cost, ε c > 0, when they are competing with a quality leader of their own country. That is, the quality leader of country D can create an additional cost (however small) to the domestic competitive fringe. For example, this could consist of small IPRs and legal barriers, distribution network, and advertisement frictions. We assume that this extra cost is entirely rebated to the consumers. 19 Since firms operate under instantaneous price competition, each top-quality producer country D firm can then maximize its profits effectively, being constrained only by threat of the foreign competitive fringe,
20 Once we account for the different technologies and pricing strategies shown here, the rest of the model follows the same structure as the baseline framework. The detailed derivation can be found in the appendix.
19 This is just an innocuous simplification useful to eliminate ε c from all the equations. Otherwise we would have to keep track of this overhead cost of manufacturing, with no qualitative change in the results. Notice that since ε c can be arbitrarily small, it would not alter the calibration either, besides arbitrarily small rounding approximations. 20 This assumption is not needed in the calibration, because parameters are still valid without the fixed costs. In fact, around the calibrated parameters, 
B. Calibration
We assume that abilities are drawn from the cumulative distribution function Γ(θ) = θ ε . This is a fairly general distribution function in [0, 1]: when ε = 1, the ability is distributed uniformly in the population; when 0 < ε < 1, the ability distribution is skewed toward low-ability workers, and for ε > 1, the ability distribution is log concave. In the quantitative analysis, we explore the effects of the reduction of the international technology gap on inequality in the period 1980 to 2000. The calibration period is one year. We have seventeen parameters to calibrate:
, and τ. Nine parameters n, λ, V , T H , γ H , φ 1 , τ, η, ρ, have close counterparts in the economy so that their calibration is straightforward. We set λ to 1.3, to match an average markup over the marginal cost of 30%. Since the estimates of average sectorial markups usually are in the interval (0.1, 0.4) (Basu, 1996) , we take a value within this range. We choose n to match a population growth rate of 1.14%, the total schooling time T H = 4, to match the average years of college in the United States, and the total working life V = 52 to match a life expectancy at birth for cohorts turning 18 years old in 1979 of 70 years (National Vital Statistics Report, 2010) . 21 Autor and Dorn (2013) show that the labor share of the set of occupations that we classified as skilled is lower than 40% in the period of interest. We follow this evidence by choosing a threshold γ H = 0.60 to bound the share of skilled workers in our economy below 40% of the workforce. The current empirical literature provides a wide range of estimates for the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. The macro-elasticity between home and imported goods is in general smaller than the micro-elasticity between foreign sources of imports. Feenstra, Obstfeld, and Russ (2012) , find that the median micro-elasticity is 3.1, while the macro-elasticity between home and imported goods is close to 1. We take a value in this range and choose η = 1.5, closer to the macro-estimates. Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2009) report an average growth of labor productivity of 1.17% a year in the period 1970 to 1979. Since steady-state growth is g = n/ (1 − φ 1 ), using this value for productivity growth and the population growth rate, we can back out φ 1 = 0.0256. We set ρ, which in steady state is equal to the interest rate r, to 0.03 to match the risk-free rate on treasury bills. Finally, we calibrate the iceberg trade cost parameter τ using recent estimates from Novy (2013) , who derive a microfounded measure of bilateral trade costs indirectly inferring trade frictions from observable trade data. The average tariffequivalent U.S. bilateral trade costs with its major trading partners is found to be 74% in 1970, which corresponds to 21 Agents choose whether to go to college at the age of 18, so the 18-year-old cohort in 1979 is represented by people born in 1961, and life expectancy at birth in 1961 in the United States is 70 years. We also include retirement years in working life by assuming that pensions are proportional (equal for simplicity) to wages during working life. setting τ = 1.74 in our model. 22 We normalize A F and z F to 1 without loss of generality.
We simultaneously choose the remaining parameters,
so that the numerical steady-state solution of the model matches relevant statistics. The parameters are calibrated in order to minimize a loss function defined by the quadratic distance between the moments in the model and the targeted statistics. Technology parameters β, ϕ, and z D pin down the factor intensity of our economy and contribute to determining the relative wagesw
Hence we target the relative wages reported in our table 2 from Autor and Dorn (2013) . The 1980 value of the ratio of the average skilled wage to average unskilled wage excluding services (1.276), the unskilled/service workers wage ratio (1.62), and the more standard skill premium, the average wage of skilled workers is divided by the average wage of all unskilled workers, production plus service sector workers. The 1980 value obtained from Autor and Dorn (2013) data is 1.37. Moreover, parameters , ε, together with β and ϕ, are key in determining the occupational structure: the share of the workforce acquiring skills, the share of unskilled workers employed in production, and the share of those employed in service activities. We use Autor and Dorn (2013) data targeting a share of skilled workers of 31% and a share of unskilled of 58%. 23 The innovation productivity parameter A D is influential in determining the geographical distribution of patents; hence, we target the average 1977-1980 share of U.S. patents 22 The U.S. major trading partners included in the estimation are Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, Korea, and Mexico. The average U.S. bilateral trade cost is obtained using bilateral trade volumes as weights. 23 The share of service sectors workers can be obtained as a residual once these other two shares are computed. in the U.S. patent office (64%) shown in the motivation section. 24 Finally, we target the 1980 wealth-to-income ratio. The statistic consistent with our theoretical model is the corporate equity/national income ratio in Piketty and Zucman (2014) , shown in figure 2.
The calibration method is the following: define m = [m 1 , . . . , m 8 ] as the vector of the real data moments described above, and y(χ) the vector of equilibrium model moments generated by some vector of parameters χ. Our calibrated parameter vector is obtained solving numericallŷ
where W is the weighting matrix. We use a diagonal matrix with the squares of the data targets on the diagonal and 0 for all other entries-formally W ii = 1/m 2 i . The set of possible parameter values Ξ contains the minimal restrictions of nonnegativity and the bound between 0 and 1 for parameters , ϕ, and β.
This procedure leads to the calibrated values listed in table 3, which also reports the fit of the calibrated model. We use "unskilled workers" (and wages) to indicate the noneducated workers employed outside personal service occupations (production and innovation) and "service workers" (and wages) to refer to unskilled workers employed in services. The model captures fairly well most features of the data, providing a good fit of the targets. 24 Notice that the sectoral production function for innnovation corresponding to cost functions 
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

C. Globalization and Wage Polarization
Here we show the effects of globalization, in the form of increasing foreign technological competition, on the wage and occupational structure. In figure 4 , we report the effects of an increase in foreign innovation productivity A F keeping A D constant. More precisely, this exercise shows how the steady state of the model changes as A F converges to A D . The key analytical results of the baseline model seem to be confirmed in the numerical simulation: the shares of skilled and service sector workers increase, while the share of unskilled workers (excluding services) decreases. Inequality at the top of the ability distribution, the skilled/unskilled relative wage, increases while inequality at the bottom, the unskilled/service wage ratio, decreases. Hence, the reduction in the technology gap reproduces qualitatively the polarization of U.S. wages and occupations documented by Autor and Dorn (2013) . The economic mechanisms connecting the technology gap and the wage structure are, as in the baseline model, the business stealing and the global competition effect. The former can be observed in the reduction in the U.S. patent share, which in the model is represented by the share of sectors with domestic leadership q D . The global competition effect can be seen in the sharp increase in the innovation difficulty index x. Finally, notice that since in this generalized model, as in the baseline model, only foreign firms can limit-price country D firms, changes in the technology gap do not affect country F polarization. As discussed in section V, the business stealing effect cannot affect the wage and the skill structure in country F, as it does not have an impact on firms' markup. The global competition effect is not operative either since the potentially higher demand for skills triggered by the increase in innovation difficulty is offset by the improvement in the relative innovation efficiency. Table 4 shows that convergence in innovation technology reproduces about 62% of the reduction in the U.S. patent share observed in the data, along with about 10% of the increase in wage inequality at the upper tails of the skill distribution (the skilled-to-unskilled wage ratio), about 18% of the decrease in inequality at the bottom of the skill distribution (unskilled/service ratio), and 16% of the increase in the skill premium documented by Autor and Dorn (2013) . These results suggest that globalization, in the form of fiercer foreign technological competition, can be an important source of wage polarization. Certainly other channels, such as routine tasks replacing technical change, and other dimensions of globalization have contributed to the recent evolution of labor market polarization. Our mechanism provides a new channel that complements existing explanations of these important facts. Finally, our model allows us to replicate a sizable share of the evolution of the wealth-to-income ratio documented by Piketty and Zucman (2014) .
Although the scope of the paper is not to explain the dynamics of inequality in the foreign region, it is worth highlighting that the model's predictions are consistent with the evidence on inequality in several advanced countries that were catching up with the United States during our period of analysis. In the literature, there is substantial evidence that the skill premium and other key measures of wage inequality are mostly stable or slightly decreasing in these countries. Fuchs-Schundeln, Krueger, and Sommer (2010) find a stable education premium and a stable residual wage variance in Germany between 1982 and 1995. Similar results can be found in Pijoan-Mas and Sanchez-Marcos (2010) for Spain, but the data are limited to the 1990s. Domenej and Floden (2010) report declines of both measures of inequality for Sweden in the period 1975 to 1995. Kambayashi, Kawaguchi, and Yokoyama (2008) and Lise et al. (2014) show that the education premium and residual wage inequality in Japan are stable or slightly declining in our period of analysis. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) find a stable education premium in Italy. Hence the stability of inequality in these countries is fairly well captured by our model.
For completeness, in the online appendix we show that if we move away from our benchmark calibration and consider the case Z D (w D L , w D H ) < τ, the model can generate a reduction in all measures of inequality in country F, in response to decreases in the technology gap. As explained above, when trade costs are large, both countries' unit costs can potentially represent the competitive fringe that pins down equilibrium limit pricing. Hence, the business stealing effect becomes operative in country F as well, but works in the opposite direction compared to country D. Foreign business stealing reduces production costs in country D, thereby increasing firm profits and the incentives to innovate. Conversely, as country F's firms steal country D's market shares, foreign production wages and unit costs increase, thus leading to lower profits and lower innovation incentives. It follows that the effect of a reduction in the technology gap on the demand for skills and on wage polarization is opposite for the two countries.
VIII. Conclusion
Technological catch-up with the United States has been a salient feature of the post-World War II global economy. Several countries have increased their ability to compete with the United States and successfully entered innovation races for global market leadership: France, Germany, Japan, and South Korea earlier and, more recently, China. This catching-up process is in part reflected in a particular dimension of globalization we zero in on, where lagging countries enter global innovation races and effectively compete with technological leaders.
Our analysis shows that such a process of technological globalization can be an important source of wage inequality. Fiercer foreign technological competition determines an erosion of U.S. industrial base, depressing unskilled wages and raising the remuneration of skilled workers. More innovation in the rest of the world also raises the difficulty of innovation; consequently, more resources must be devoted to it in order to compete on the global playing field. Thus, the demand for highly skilled workers, used more intensively in innovation, increases with their remuneration. As skilled labor time becomes more valuable, personal services that free labor time are more in demand, thus generating an upward pressure on wages and employment levels. Hence, globalization leads to wage polarization, to the advantage of the upper and lower tails of the skill distribution and the detriment of occupations performed by workers with intermediate levels of skills. When matched to U.S. data, our model reproduces a nonnegligible part of the increase in U.S. wage polarization in the 1980-2000 period.
An additional prediction of our model is that more intense foreign technological competition increases the wealth-toincome ratio, in line with recent evidence. Globalization increases corporate profits and the market value of leading firms by reducing labor costs and increasing the competition for global market leadership. Since wealth is the aggregate stock market value of firms, globalization leads to a higher wealth-to-income ratio along with faster technical change and growth. Hence, our Schumpeterian framework suggests that innovation and growth, rather than economic stagnation, are the ultimate sources of inequality. 25 25 For an different view see Piketty (2014) and Piketty and Zucman (2014) .
